Luther H. Martin
I…choose to blame…complexity on realitythough it is of course possible that we just do not understand everything well enough to find the hidden simplicity. Papadimitriou's conjecture emphasizes both the complexity of explaining the behaviors of innumerable historical agents as well as the neuronal complexity underlying each of these agent's behaviors. "How do you make a theory out of that?" he asks. "In order to make progress," in the face of such complexity, Papadimitriou proposes that you have to make simplifying assumptions, isolate a small part of the problem, focus on a few key aspects of the situation, perhaps grossly exaggerate some things, and ignore the rest. And then you may prove an interesting theorem.1
The interesting theorems arrived at through such simplifications can then be modeled by computer simulations or explored by controlled laboratory experimentation, which may produce patterns of human behavior previously unnoted by historians or confirm those that have (e.g., Turchin 2007: 262-266). Both of these approaches serve well to constrain and to control the elaborate explanations often proposed by overly-exuberant historians as well as to identify behavioral dispositions beyond the purview of historical inquiry.
But you have to remember, Papadimitriou concludes, that the value of such interesting theorems "is delimited by the extent to which your assumptions are reasonable, [i.e., that they] capture the essence of a given…situation" (p. 164). That is to say, computer simulations or experimental results, necessarily based upon "simplifying assumptions" about human behaviors, should, when identified, be observable in "given situations" throughout the expanse of human history-"in the field," as it were. And, such simulations or experimental results can only be judged "reasonable" if they contribute to explanations of specific historical and ethnographic circumstances-that is, if they are confirmed by, as well as contribute to, generalizable explanations of what real people in real-life situations actually do. In this way, the work of evolutionary and cognitive scientists and that of historians must be complementary. Whereas the evolutionary and cognitive sciences can provide new and previously unnoticed possibilities for framing historical investigations, historians may, in turn, identify relevant real-world variables that have escaped the simplifying and "presentist" biases of
